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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 











Frank Vittorio, 17-B-1002 
So:uthport C.F. 
236 Bob Masia Drive 
P.O. Box 2000 
Pine City, NY 14871-20.00 
11-055-18 B 
October 2018 decision denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Smith, Coppola 
Appellant's Letter-briefreceived February 3, 20.19 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
_Vacated, remanded for' de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
·~firm~d _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ---~,_,' O~-&--"""""'-'::;__ 
Distribution: Appeals Unit..:... Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Vittorio, Frank DIN: 17-B-1002  
Facility: Southport CF AC No.:  11-055-18 B 
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Appellant was sentenced to two years, four months to seven years upon his conviction of 
two counts of DWI – 3d Offense.  In the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the October 2018 
determination of the Board denying release and imposing a 24-month hold as excessive.  He 
highlights such matters as his program achievements, clean disciplinary record and receipt of an 
EEC. 
 
Generally, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted unless the Board determines that 
an inmate meets three standards: “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he 
will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with 
the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  The Board must 
consider factors relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s 
institutional record and criminal behavior.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  In addition, the Board 
must consider the inmate’s most current risk and needs assessment (i.e., COMPAS instrument) and 
offender case plan.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); Correction Law § 71-a.  Whereas here the inmate 
has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction 
Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 
264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 
1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  An EEC does not 
automatically guarantee release or eliminate consideration of the statutory factors, including the 
instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 
N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 
1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 
N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006). 
 
 While consideration of the statutory factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a 
prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 
(2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the 
Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017).  In the absence of 
a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
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680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 
A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990).   
 
 The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant DWI offenses, the second of which was committed 
while Appellant was out on bail for the first; Appellant’s criminal history including three prior 
State terms, misdemeanors for drinking and driving and parole violations; ; 
his institutional record including receipt of an EEC,  and clean discipline; and 
release plans to live with a friend and return to work.  The Board also had before it and considered, 
among other things, official statements from the sentencing court and defense attorney, 
Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and Appellant’s submission, letters of support 
and relapse prevention plan. 
 
 After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the applicable standards for release.  In reaching its conclusion, 
the Board permissibly relied on the fact that prior sanctions failed to deter Appellant from committing 
the instant offenses, that his criminal history includes multiple prior DWI convictions, that prior 
programs in prison and , and elevated scores in the 
COMPAS instrument.  See Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d 
Dept. 2017); Matter of Singh v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 
24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2014); Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d at 914, 680 
N.Y.S.2d at 390.  The Board acted within its discretion in determining these considerations rebutted 
any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release inappropriate at this time.   
See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 342 (3d Dept. 2015). 
 
 Moreover, the Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months 
is within the Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) 
and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 
737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or 
improper. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
